David Strong, former managing director of BRE, has called for complete reform of the Building Regulations in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire as a retired court of appeal judge has been named to head up the public inquiry into the disaster.
In a letter published in The Times, Strong said it was not austerity that caused the fire, but a “fundamental market failure resulting from Building Control bodies competing with each other to deliver enforcement with the lightest possible touch”.
As prime minister Theresa May confirmed yesterday that 120 tower blocks in 37 English authorities had failed fire safety tests, Strong asked how Grenfell Tower could have been issued with a completion certificate if the cladding did not comply with regulations.
“The introduction of competition between Building Control bodies has led to increasingly poor enforcement and a race to the bottom.”
David Strong
Competition and market forces had driven a deadly drop in standards, he said, adding that completion certificates should guarantee that the work and material used were consistent with the regulations.
“However, the introduction of competition between Building Control bodies has led to increasingly poor enforcement and a race to the bottom,” he wrote.
“Nothing short of a root-and-branch review of Building Control is required, to ensure that our buildings are safe and fit for purpose.”
On Wednesday evening May also named retired Court of Appeal judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick to lead the public inquiry into the fire disaster.
Moore-Bick will work with complete independence from the government, and he will be supported by civil servants seconded from government departments.
His appointment comes as at least 80 people are now believed to have died after the fire, most of them from just 23 of the 129 flats in the building. This number is still expected to rise further.
Separate to the independent inquiry, communities secretary Sajid Javid also announced a new independent expert advisory panel to advise on any immediate measures that can be put in place to make buildings safer following the disaster.
The expert panel will look at any immediate action that is required so the public can be confident everything possible is being done to make all public and private buildings safe as quickly as possible.
It will be made up of a range of building and fire safety experts, and will be chaired by Sir Ken Knight, former London Fire Commissioner and former government Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser.
Other core members of the panel will be Peter Bonfield, chief executive of BRE, Roy Wilsher, chair of the National Fire Chiefs Council and Amanda Clack, EY partner and president of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. It is intended that a first meeting of the panel will take place this week.
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This seems to be a smoke screen trying to divert attention.
Should building control be made to phisically test products being used?
The cladding used had a Class O fire rating, which means the product must have been tested at some point. If the cladding now does not meet the test for Class O either the product has changed since the test, or it was a “bad test”. Either way this is where the issue lies in my mind.
I do not know the testing process, but this too would need looking into, as I don’t understand how something with this rating burned so well. Possibly the testing process is not vigorous enough?
There are many questions to be answered, but I think his comments are avoiding the real issues.
I couldn’t agree more Martin it’s bit like closing the door after the horse has bolted. David Strong’s comments that building control bodies are competing with each other to achieve sign off is ludicrous they are responsible for compliance not testing.
The blame for this terrible incident must lie with the decision makers, the local authorities for allowing flammable materials to be fitted to high rise buildings, politicians for voting against sprinkler systems and ill equipped fire and rescue, designers for specifying this material when it is clearly banned in commercial sectors.
What testing have the BRE done on these materials in such situations?
I agree with Martin. If a full review is to happen, then this should include the role of BRE and BBA.
Those of us who have watched the building regulations expand like an inflating barrage balloon since 1974, and hold to the thesis that more of the same is generally not better, can hardly be surprised that fitness for purpose is now in doubt. Plain English has been replaced by mountains of verbiage in which you can hide more sins than even a politician could manage in a lifetime.
That the regs are the sole cause, or even anything other than peripheral to the main issues, is missing the point by more miles than you cover in inter-planetary travel. The UK developed a number of non-conventional dwelling types, including low, medium and high rise, in the three decades 1950-80. Virtually all were developed – but not built – by local authorities, and they were for everyone, not just the poor.
By the early 1970’s – forty five years ago – it was obvious that there was a lot wrong with these ‘system built’ dwellings, and local authorities set up departments to look at the issues and solve them. Since 1980 successive administrations in Westminster have sought actively to avoid responsibility for these problems, many of which were a direct consequence of Whitehall forcing local authorities to build the unconventional. At the same time local authorities have been prevented from getting any sort of grip on the problems, and few of the construction industry movers and shakers would go near a local authority job, even if it paid the market rate. How then did these problems get solved?
The simple answer is that they did not, and of late we have had housing for the poor – which is all local authority housing now is – shoved off into arm’s length bodies whose expertise and ability to handle large amounts of money and complex technical issues must be severely doubted.
This is the problem many local authorities faced decades ago, and demolished many of the worst blocks; the problems could not be solved in the circumstances – social and financial – they found themselves in. It was not – primarily – their doing; the buck is firmly in the soon to be refurbished at a cost of £5bn+ Palace of Westminster. Priorities, priorities.
High rise dwellings work – with the right social mix and the resources to cover the issues that arise. As places to isolate and demonise the poor, as we have done over the past four decades, they are places no sprinklers, fire shutters, multiple exit routes or innovative ‘deemed to satisfy’ regulations are ever going to make safe.
Owen Jordan.
This catastrophe is partly the result of the poor training the construction industry has been subjected to over many years where the emphasis has been on process at the expense of product knowledge. The degree of outsourcing right through the delivery chain has also exacerbated this problem.
This building was designed in the seventies when standards would have included the provision of a dedicated alternative means of escape for the occupants. If it didn’t have a secondary stair exit then the design responsibility becomes a matter of conscience for the Architect, Planning Officer, Chief Building Inspector and Chief Fire Officer at the time. The quite unbelievable signage by whoever to quote ‘STAY PUT and put a blanket under the door in case of Fire is absolute negligence. Hands up those who authorised this pathetic instruction. Eighty men women and children have died a horrible death due to total incompetence of individuals both past and present.
It would appear that we can lay blame at many doors. However the one consistency is pointing towards standards. Why would a designer put a flammable material onto a residential tower block? Why did it get passed by building control? Were all checks actually carried out before, during and after the works? Did the cladding meet the building regulations for fire at the time of installation? and many more questions that remain unanswered. It would appear we are looking for a scapegoat, one person or company to lay the blame on but it is likely that a number of factors, errors or omissions are going to the cause of the blaze spreading in the way it did. Falling standards, that can be blamed on any number of factors such as increasing workloads are leading to a significant drop in standards and this is becoming very dangerous.
Building Regulations, since 1667 (also responding to a catastrophic fire event) have been laid for a reason. Minimum standards to provide safety and to create a consistent approach to safety measures. Sometimes they are wrong. Sometimes other factors cause a disaster or failure of a system that has previously worked well. To blame Building Control for this is like blaming the police for all the road traffic deaths. Yes we could apply belt and braces standards and draconian checks and controls but no-one in any industry does this. Austerity is irrelevant – Approved Inspectors / Private Building Control – equally blameless in a system that evolves by reacting to statistics and incidents. The fire crews driving in to the incident were right “how did this happen ?” “that’s not supposed to happen”. A month ago we had some of the lowest figures for deaths on record. From 1000 a year down to under 300. Currently we don’t know why these events transpired. Maybe we ought to establish this before beheading anyone at the Tower.